Політика умиротворення як фактор підриву європейської безпеки: аналітичний погляд через призму російської війни в Україні

Abstract

This article examines the phenomenon of appeasement policy as one of the key factors destabilizing the European security system in the context of Russian aggression against Ukraine. Appeasement policy is seen as a set of diplomatic, economic, military, and political concessions to the aggressor state, aimed at preventing the escalation of the conflict by partially or fully satisfying its demands or strategic interests. The paper analyses the historical evolution of this approach and its classic implementation – the 1938 Munich Agreement, which became the unsuccessful applying symbol of the concessions strategy to Nazi Germany and demonstrated that such compromises can only reinforce the aggressive intentions of authoritarian regimes. The paper analyses contemporary forms of appeasement with regard to the Russian Federation based on historical parallels. Particular attention is focused on the period after the Russian Federation’s military aggression against Georgia in 2008, when the European Union and individual European states resumed political dialogue and expanded economic cooperation with Russia, thereby effectively neutralising the consequences of its aggressive actions. It is shown that this strategy continued after the start of Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014, through the applying of limited sanctions, despite their declining effectiveness over time, the dominance of diplomatic forms of interaction, sectoral deepening of cooperation, and excessive faith in negotiation mechanisms contributed to the formation of Russia’s conviction that there would be no harsh political or military response from the West. The article argues that the prolonged applying of appeasement policy was one of the factors that contributed to the Russian Federation’s preparation and implementation of a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This policy created favourable conditions for the Russian Federation to build up its military capabilities, strengthen its authoritarian regime, and escalate its revisionist ambitions in the post-Soviet space, primarily Ukraine. Based on the analysis, it can be argued that the experience of appeasing Russia confirms the historical conclusion that concessions to the aggressor do not ensure peace but, on the contrary, undermine the foundations of collective security and encourage further aggression.